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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States currently has two systems for processing
individuals who commit crime: the criminal justice system for adults and
the juvenile justice system for children. Not long ago these systems
differed significantly in virtually all respects, including their underlying
principles, their procedures, and their dispositions. Most importantly,
while punishment for adults was premised on retribution and deterrence,
children were generally subject to diversion or short-term legal restraint
which, at least in theory, emphasized rehabilitation.
Between the late 1960s and the present, however, the juvenile
system's philosophy and structure have increasingly come to mimic the
adult system. Spurred by courts and commentators worried about abuse
and a public concerned about increasing juvenile crime rates, legislatures
have narrowed juvenile court jurisdiction, nudged what is left of that
jurisdiction toward a punishment orientation that often downplays
treatment, and imposed adult criminal procedures and determinate
sentences. In at least some states, the two systems seem on the verge of
becoming one, and many advocate for just such a merger, albeit perhaps
with special dispositional accommodations for children.'
This standard story about the recent past and near future of the two
systems has become more complicated, however, because of the Supreme
Court's 1997 decision in Kansas v. Hendricks.2 In Hendricks, the Court
held that the state could confine indefinitely a sex offender who had
served his sentence, based solely on a showing of dangerousness caused
by a "mental abnormality" that leads to difficulty in controlling behavior.
Severe mental illness, of the type normally required for civil commitment,
need not be proven as a predicate for this preventive detention.3 With
this holding the Court put its imprimatur on a new method of dealing with
adult criminals, one grounded solely in forward-looking prevention and
treatment rather than on backward-looking punishment for crimes
committed. In other words, the Court sanctioned a system for adults-at
least recidivist adults-very much like the one juveniles experienced three
1. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood andReconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Robert
0. Dawson, The Future of Juvenile Justice: Is It Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1990); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile
Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L.
23 (1990); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
2. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
3. Id. at 360 ("Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a 'mental
abnormality' under the Act .... plainly suffices for due process purposes.").
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decades ago. We are in the somewhat ironic position of modifying the
adult system in the direction of the old juvenile court at the same time the
juvenile system is moving toward the adult punishment model.
Of course there are differences between a Hendricks regime and the
traditional juvenile one. The sexual predator statute at issue in Hendricks
appears to be aimed primarily at incapacitation,4 while the original
juvenile court was more attuned to rehabilitation, ideally with minimal
associated confinement.5 The term "sexual predator" conjures up a
hardened, incorrigible criminal who is unable to control his actions, while
juvenile delinquents, in common parlance, are maladjusted kids who can
be straightened out with enough effort. But the fundamental premise of
the Kansas sexual predator statute and the original version of the
delinquency system is the same: prevention rather than punishment is the
primary goal.
Hendricks has been roundly castigated by, most commentators.6
Even those who support the holding believe it should be read very
narrowly.7  This Article argues that, whatever may be the proper
response to Hendricks in the adult context, the prevention model8 it
endorses is the correct one for juvenile justice. It argues further that this
4. The statute at issue in Hendricks stated in its preamble:
In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under [the general
involuntary civil commitment statute], sexually violent predators generally
have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to existing mental
illness treatment modalities and those features render them likely to engage in
sexually violent behavior. . . . The existing involuntary commitment
procedure . . . is inadequate to address the risk. these sexually violent
predators pose to society."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1997).
5. See HERBERT H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-21 (1927)
(describing rehabilitation and probation as "cardinal" aspects of the juvenile system); see
also ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d
ed. 1977).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58 for a summary of the criticisms.
7. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Incapacitation by Civil Commitment of
Pathologically Violent Sex Offenders, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER
384 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996); John Kip Cornwell,
Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil
Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377 (1998).
8. In public health, psychology, and other disciplines, the term "prevention"
encompasses several types of intervention, depending on the status of the target and the
timing of the intervention. In this Article, use of the term generally constitutes either
secondary, or selective intervention (i.e., intervention designed to identify delinquency at
an early stage to reduce its length and severity), and tertiary prevention, or treatment
(i.e., intervention to reduce the degree of impairment that results from delinquency that
has already occurred). Primary or universal preventive interventions target a population
in which the disorder (e.g., delinquency) has not yet occurred.
1999:185
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model, which Hendricks recognized as a means of controlling those who
have difficulty controlling themselves, justifies better than any other why
a separate juvenile justice system should be maintained. While both the
greater malleability of children and their lesser culpability may partially
rationalize such a system, it is the greater undeterrability of youth that
best explains why they should be treated differently than adults.
Conceptualizing the goal of the juvenile delinquency system in terms
of prevention also has significant implications for the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, for the law of transfer to adult court, and for the types of
interventions that should take place in the juvenile system. Juvenile court
jurisdiction should be based on dangerousness, not culpability (although
utilitarian concerns lead us to conclude that culpability should nonetheless
play a significant role in determining the threshold for state intervention).
Similarly, transfer of a juvenile to adult court should not be based on
culpability, as it currently is in practice and increasingly in official
doctrine as well, but rather reserved for those who are truly unamenable
to treatment, a very narrow category of people. In addition, the penchant
in the juvenile system for medical-model interventions should give way
to ecological approaches that current social science research suggests are
much more effective at prevention.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes Hendricks's
reasoning in more detail and explains how it helps justify an independent
juvenile delinquency system. Part III then describes how the prevention
model affects juvenile court jurisdiction, in terms of who is subject to that
system, who belongs in adult court, and who should be immune from any
type of state intervention. Part IV provides an overview of the optimal
ways in which prevention can be achieved for those who remain in the
juvenile system, focusing on new developments in "risk management."
The overarching goal is to demonstrate how Hendricks might breathe new
life into a juvenile system that is in danger of sliding into oblivion.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR A SEPARATE
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SYSTEM
A. A Typology of Systems
Variations in substantive criminal justice can be reduced to three
basic forms: the retributive model, the preventive model, and some hybrid
of the two. 9 The retributive model is focused on punishing blameworthy
offenders for their acts. It is backward-looking and culpability oriented.
9. For an elaborate version of these variations, see Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid
Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).
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The preventive model is focused on preventing anti-social conduct. It is
forward-looking and based on predictions of dangerousness. Under this
model, culpability is irrelevant; a non-dangerous person who commits a
culpable act is left alone, while a dangerous person who has yet to act on
his or her propensities may not be. The hybrid model can take many
forms, but two will be emphasized here. The first, the retributive hybrid,
requires a culpable act for intervention and imposes a maximum sentence
based on retributive principles, such as desert for the offense, but allows
preventive concerns to dictate the nature and ultimate length of the
sentence within the retributive range. A second form, the preventive
hybrid, also requires a culpable act for intervention, but then focuses
entirely on prevention in fashioning a disposition, with the result that
sentences are indeterminate.
Adult criminal justice has vacillated between the retributive and
hybrid models, while the juvenile delinquency system began as a
preventive regime and has since moved in the direction of the other
models. Most modern reformers of both the adult and juvenile systems
have advocated a purely retributive model or some version of it. Some
reformers simply believe the retributive approach is the most effective
way of implementing a "get-tough" attitude on crime. But many have
also argued that a "just deserts" orientation based on the nature of the
offense rather than the nature of the offender is the only just system, is
better at reducing disparity and is more easily administered.'0
Reformers who would move the juvenile court in particular in this
direction assert further that the retributive model is more likely to be
accompanied by procedural protections than a rehabilitation-oriented
system that sees adversarial rights as an obstacle to accomplishing what
is "best" for the child." Proponents of the preventive model and the
hybrid models are more optimistic about the predictive and treatment
capabilities of the criminal justice system. They also believe that the
retributive model is more likely to lead to counterproductive, and even
inhumane, sentences.12
It seems likely that the retributive model will be the predominant
version of adult criminal justice in this country in the foreseeable
10. The most conspicuous exposition of this stance is ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
11. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 1, at 70 ("[Juvenile courts] provide delinquents
with fewer and less adequate procedural safeguards than those available to criminal
defendants .... [and] the juvenile court's deficiencies reflect a fundamental flaw in [the
court's] conception.").
12. See generally SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 191-99 (1987).
1999:185
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future. 3 We examine below whether there is any rationale for rejecting
the retributive approach in the juvenile context. More specifically, this
Section focuses on whether there is a justification for maintaining an
independent juvenile delinquency system based on a preventive or hybrid
model.
B. The Standard Arguments:
Malleability and Diminished Responsibility
Two bases for a separate juvenile system have been advanced. The
original juvenile court was grounded primarily on the utilitarian notion
that children (used interchangeably here with adolescents and juveniles)
are more treatable than adults, and thus should benefit from a more
treatment-oriented system. 14 This assertion can be broken down into
several different assumptions: (1) children are less set in their ways and
thus easier to change than adults; (2) children are more likely than adults
to change in the wrong direction if the two groups are confined together;
and (3) in a world with limited funds, money is better spent intervening
early, rather than late, in life. Each of these assumptions can be correct
even if the other two are incorrect.
The second argument in favor of a separate juvenile court is based
on culpability. Children, it is asserted, are less responsible for their
actions because of cognitive and volitional developmental deficiencies and
thus should receive special treatment. 15 Most who make this assertion
today do not contend that any but the youngest children are completely
unaccountable for their actions. Rather, the usual stance along these lines
is that the moral and decision-making capacities of children between seven
and eighteen are inferior, albeit decreasingly so, and this inferiority
13. Probably the single best indicator of this trend is the tendency in the states to
follow the lead of the federal government in adopting sentencing guidelines that focus
entirely on culpability-related factors in determining sentence. See generally SENTENCING
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES (Michael Tonry & Kathleey Hatlestad eds., 1997).
14. See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND
COMMENTS 551 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974) (explaining the
juvenile court's assumption that "children were infinitely malleable, the best possible
subjects for the new social sciences to work wonders upon"); Anna Louise Simpson,
Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64
CAL. L. REV. 984 (1976).
15. See Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders To Be Punished:
Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 191 (1989) ("The
juvenile court movement assumed that young people under an articulated statutory age
(sometimes as high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational decisionmaking and thus
lack the capacity for moral accountability assumed by the punitive model.").
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should be recognized through more lenient treatment in a separate
system. 16
The factual assumptions underlying these arguments may well be
accurate. Indeed, this Article subscribes to at least the second and third
propositions about treatability laid out above, as well as to the idea that,
compared to adults, children as a class are not as psychologically
developed in legally relevant ways. Neither argument, however,
persuasively establishes that a preventive regime of juvenile system is
justified.
This conclusion is most apparent with respect to the diminished
responsibility rationale. The premise of this argument is the retribution-
based notion that relative culpability matters, which is identical to the
premise of the punishment-based adult system. At most this argument
supports handling children similarly to adults who suffer from mental
illness or retardation, are provoked into committing crime, or for some
other reason deserve mitigation. The approach most consistent with the
diminished responsibility rationale would be to try children in adult court
and either acquit them on insanity/infancy grounds, convict them on lesser
charges, or impose more lenient sentences."
The malleability argument in favor of a separate juvenile system
comes closer to supporting a preventive regime, but it is ultimately flawed
as well. The assumption that children are more amenable to treatment
than adults may support providing more treatment modalities and separate
facilities for youth. But by itself, this rationale cannot support a separate
juvenile regime, for reasons grounded in both the Constitution and in
good policy.
O'Connor v. Donaldson"s is the most important case in this regard.
In Donaldson, the Supreme Court held that the government may not
deprive people of liberty merely because they are mentally ill or because
such deprivation might, through treatment or otherwise, improve their
lifestyle. 19 Although the Court was coy about its rationale, it likely
believed that the government has no business forcing treatment even on
eminently treatable individuals if they are competent to make their own
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution ofAdolescence:
A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137 (1997).
17. This is precisely the regime many commentators who subscribe to the
punishment model have proposed. See Feld, supra note 1.
18. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
19. See id. at 575 ("A finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will .... incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary
condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom,
on their own or With the help of family or friends.").
1999:185
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decisions and are not significantly harmful to themselves or others. 20 In
any event, most courts and commentators have interpreted Donaldson to
mean that a person may be subject to involuntary treatment only when
one of two showings is made: the person either has committed a culpable
act (which triggers some version of the retributive model) or is dangerous
to self or others (the preventive model).2'
In short, treatability by itself cannot be a sufficient basis for a regime
of coerced intervention (although, as developed below, an argument can
be made that it is a necessary factor under some coercive intervention
regimes). The question thus remains: is there a good rationale for a
separate juvenile delinquency system based on the preventive model?
C. A Different Argument: Undeterrability
There is a rationale for a separate, prevention-oriented juvenile
system that is superior to both the diminished responsibility and greater
malleability explanations. That rationale comes from an unlikely source:
a case that deals not with children, but with adults.
1. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
Two terms ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kansas v.
Hendricks.2 The decision upheld long-term preventive confinement of
sex offenders who have a mental abnormality that predisposes them to
commit other offenses. Hendricks has deservedly received much
attention.' At the least, it signals the Court's approval of a new type
of preventive confinement. More radically, it may foreshadow the end
of the (retributive) adult criminal justice system as the primary means of
protecting society from crime.
20. See id. ("Assuming ... that the 'mentally ill' can be identified with
reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons
involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.").
21. See, e.g., Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424,430-32 (D.
Utah 1979) (construing Donaldson to require either mental illness and danger to others
or mental illness, an immediate danger to self and an inability to make a rational decision
about treatment); JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 97-98 (1992).
A harbinger of Donaldson was State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 113 (W.
Va. 1974), which struck down a statute permitting commitment of a mentally ill person
found "in need of custody, care or treatment in a hospital."
22. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
23. For instance, an entire issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, see 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (1998), consisting of over 550 pages and 20 articles, is
devoted to analysis of the case.
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The United States has had sex offender legislation before. But those
old statutes-called sex-psychopath or mentally-disordered sex offender
laws-provided an alternative disposition for those who commit sex
crimes. The Kansas statute at issue in Hendricks permits an additional
disposition, after the person has served the sentence. 4 In other words,
the Kansas statute permits confinement based on dangerousness alone,
with no necessary connection to a particular criminal act.
One interpretation of Hendricks, which the majority itself seems to
adopt, is that the holding merely applies accepted preventive detention
doctrine to a new context. According to this view, Hendricks simply
recognizes that civil commitment of the mentally ill, which has always
been permitted, may include preventive confinement of sex offenders.
The common law has long held that, under the state's police power,
mentally ill people who are dangerous may be confined
indeterminately,' a practice that the Supreme Court has refused to find
unconstitutional on several occasions dating back to the 1970s.26 Thus,
this interpretation holds, Hendricks fits snugly within the tradition of
protecting society through the commitment of people with mental illness
who are likely to be violent in the future.
The problem with this interpretation is that the statute at issue in
Hendricks does not represent "traditional" police power commitment, at
least as that tradition has been reconstructed by theorists. Police power
civil commitment, under the most widely accepted theory, permits the
state to confine only those people who are "insane," that is, people who
are so cognitively or volitionally impaired that they are incapable of
obeying the criminal law. The state is justified in using a protective
mechanism other than criminal punishment of past acts only for people for
whom criminal punishment is meaningless. As the Harvard Law Review
stated years ago:
24. The statute contemplates commitment of sex offenders who are found not
guilty by reason of insanity, those who are found incompetent to stand trial, and most
importantly for present purposes, those who are convicted and scheduled for release. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1997).
25. See In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122, 124 (Mass. 1845) ("The right to restrain
an insane person of his liberty, is found in that great law of humanity, which makes it
necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or
others.").
26. For instance, in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972), the Court
noted that the states "have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons found
to be mentally ill." Although it was willing to limit that power, in no way did the Court
suggest it should be eliminated. See id. at 738. More recent cases standing for a similar
proposition include Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), and Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
1999:185
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By requiring aconviction before depriving persons who are not
mentally ill of their liberty, the criminal law system relies on
deterrence to reduce antisocial behavior. A state could argue
that this punishment-deterrence approach fosters personal
autonomy by allowing its citizens to choose whether to obey the
law. . . .This justification would seem to provide a distinction
between equally dangerous groups of mentally healthy and
criminally insane individuals . . . .The latter group contains
individuals whose mental condition excludes them from the
operation, of the traditional punishment-deterrence system,
because they are both unable to make autonomous decisions
about their antisocial behavior and unaffected by the prospect of
punishment.2"
On its face, the statute at issue in Hendricks requires neither proof
that its subjects are unable to make autonomous decisions nor proof that
they are unaffected by the prospect of punishment. Instead, the statute
authorizes confinement of any dangerous sex offender who suffers from
a "mental abnormality" that "predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others."' This definition of mental abnormality
hardly bespeaks insanity in the sense described by the Harvard Law
Review.
Perhaps recognizing this fact, the Hendricks majority construed the
Kansas statute to allow commitment only of people who suffer from a
condition "that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their
behavior."'29 At one point, going well beyond anything in the language
or legislative history of the Act, the majority even read the law to limit
confinement to those "who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering
27. Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1232-33 (1974) (citations omitted); see also Stephen J. Morse, A
Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 59-62 (1982) (arguing that people with mental disorder
generally have behavioral control, but noting that lack thereof could be a justification for
commitment); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert,
76 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1996); Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of
the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161, 182 (1995) ("[Clognitive impairment of the ability
to direct one's conduct through a process of practical reasoning . . . . renders one
ineligible to participate in the rule-based criminal justice system and relegates one to the
mental health component of the institution of social control.").
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1997).
29. 521 U.S. at 362.
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them dangerous beyond their control." 3" This language does sound like
insanity, at least under the volitional prong of the defense." Although
that prong has fallen into disfavor of late, it is still recognized by several
states.32
The Court's interpretation of the Kansas law notwithstanding, the sex
offenders committed under that statute and like statutes are, not insane.
Proof of this assertion is simple: people committed under these laws,
including Hendricks himself, have been convicted on (and served time
for) their sex offense charge, not excused on grounds of insanity. Indeed,
a prosecutor, at least one in a pre-Hendricks regime,33 would fight tooth-
and-nail against an insanity claim in such cases, and would virtually
always win. Moreover, as many have argued,3' prosecutors should
prevail in such cases. Although people who suffer from pedophilia like
Hendricks may have strong antisocial urges, their cognitive capacities are
generally intact and they exhibit much greater control of their actions than
the severely mentally ill, as evidenced by their ability to exercise stealth
and foresight in carrying out their acts.
Hendricks thus creates a new category of people who may be
preventively detained for long periods of time: non-insane people who
cannot "adequately" control their behavior. This category does not have
to be (and will not be) limited to sex offenders. For instance, California
has enacted generalized "mentally disordered prisoners" legislation
allowing confinement of any offenders who have been convicted of and
served sentences for serious crimes and are considered dangerous because
30. Id. at 358.
31. The volitional prong of the defense, as encapsulated by the Model Penal
Code, recognizes a defense when a person's mental disease or defect renders him or her
substantially unable to conform behavior at the time of the offense to the requirements of
the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
32. See generally RALPH REI6NER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPEcTS 526-27 (3d ed. 1999).
33. Interestingly enough, under a full-fledged Hendricks-type regime the
prosecutor might have significant incentive to assert the insanity defense, to ensure long-
term confinement.
34. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 250, 263 (1998) ("Most arguments that facilely suggest that
sexual impulses or desires, or any other kind, are necessarily uncontrollable are
conceptually and empirically unsupported."); Schopp, supra note 27, at 190 ("Accepting
the proposition that individuals cannot control these intrusive [sexual] urges and fantasies
in the sense that they cannot simply decide not to experience such mental events does not
entail that they cannot refrain from acting on these mental events."); Bruce J. Winick, Sex
Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 505, 529-30 (1998) ("Because [sexual predators] can control their conduct,
their repeated antisocial behavior should be subjected to criminal condemnation that holds
them responsible for their actions.").
1999:185
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of a "mental disorder."35 Thus Hendricks may signal a significant trend
in criminal justice, away from the retributive model toward the preventive
one.
2. HOW HENDRICKS JUSTIFIES A SEPARATE JUVENILE SYSTEM-THE
DIMINISHED DETERRABILITY OF YOUTH
The new criminal paradigm authorized by Hendricks has been the
target of substantial criticism, much of it well-founded. But it may have
a silver lining. For Hendricks may provide the theoretical support that to
date has been lacking for a separate juvenile system based on the
preventive model. A good argument can be made that dangerous youthful
offenders should constitute one of the subcategories of people who are
eligible for the regime authorized by Hendricks. Furthermore, we believe
that the criticisms levelled at Hendricks, whatever their merit in the adult
context, are relatively toothless when Hendricks is applied to children.
The basis for the first assertion is that children, compared to adults,
appear to be much less capable of controlling their criminal behavior. In
other words, children are less deterrable than adults. Thus, like sex
offenders, they can be subject to a preventive regime.
The evidence of this diminished deterrability among children comes
from many sources. The focus here will be on the literature regarding
risk perception and preference, temporal perspective, the effects of peer
influence, and what might be called "stake-in-life" research. All four
bodies of research suggest that the average adolescent, typically defined
as a youth up to eighteen, differs from the average adult in ways that
diminish willingness to pay attention to the criminal law.
Common stereotypes about adolescents portray them as risk
takers-more willing to take risks than adults and more likely to believe
that they will avoid the negative consequences of risky behavior.
Developmental psychology research supports this perception. Not only
do adolescents prefer to engage in risky or sensation-seeking behavior,36
but, perhaps just as important, they may have different perceptions of risk
itself. For example, adolescents appear to be unaware of some risks of
35. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 1999) (permitting commitment of
people who have a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in
remission without treatment and who represent a substantial danger of physical harm to
others).
36. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 249, 260 (1996) ("The few extant comparisons of adults and adolescents suggest
that thrill seeking and disinhibition (as assessed via measures of sensation seeking) may
be higher during adolescence than adulthood.") (citations omitted).
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which adults are aware, and to calculate the probability of positive and
negative consequences differently than adults."
The theoretical implications of these differences in risk perception for
deterrence policies are relatively clear. Deterrence is premised on the
ability of the individual to assess the benefits of engaging in criminal
behavior versus the expected costs of punishment. Adolescents appear to
calculate the risks of getting caught and punished differently than adults;
that is, they do not assess the certainty of punishment in the same way
adults would, or indeed as they themselves would once they become
adults. Keane and his colleagues assert that adolescents who are risk-
takers are more resistant to social control and less susceptible to
deterrence.38 If adolescents as a class are more likely than adults to be
risk-takers, then this assessment applies to the entire age group.
Issues of risk perception are closely related to those of temporal
perspective, sometimes described as future orientation. Generally,
adolescents tend to focus more on short-term consequences and less on the
long-term impact of a decision or behavior.39 This focus on the
immediate makes some intuitive sense: adolescents have had less
experience with long-term consequences due to their age and they may be
uncertain about what the future holds for them. This foreshortened time
perspective may lead adolescents to discount the severity of punishment
in a deterrence framework, particularly if it is linked to extended time
37. See Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 542 (1981)
("Differences in decision approach among the three grade-level groups (seventh-eighth,
tenth, and twelfth) include increases, with grade-level, in mention of the risks and future
consequences of decisions . . . ."); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent
Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995)
("Compared to adults, adolescents appear to focus less on protection against losses than
on opportunities for gains in making choices. Adolescents appear to weigh the negative
consequences of not engaging in risky behaviors more heavily than adults . . .. )
(citations omitted); William Gardner & Janna Herman, Developmental Change in Decision
Making. Use of Multiplicative Strategies and Sensitivity to Losses 8 (1991) (paper
presented at the 1991 Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
Seattle, Wash.) ("Given the presumption that adults are, on average, risk averse, the
finding that young children are generally risk seeking is striking and poses the question
of what induces the shift.").
38. See Carl Keane et al., Deterrence and Amplification of Juvenile Delinquency
by Police Contact: The Importance of Gender and Risk-Orientation, 29 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 336, 338 (1989) ("We suggest that those adolescents who are risk-takers
will be more resistant to familial and formal control .... ).
39. See Scott et al., supra note 37, at 231 ("In general, adolescents seem to
discount the future more than adults and to weigh more heavily the short-term
consequences of decisions-both risks and benefits-a response that in some settings
contributes to risky behavior.") (citation omitted).
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periods of social control or incarceration. Long-term punishments may
not trigger the same aversion in a fourteen or fifteen year-old as they do
in a twenty-four year-old.'
Peer influence can also affect deterrability. Adolescence is usually
described as a period in which childhood reliance on parents lessens as
reliance on the peer group increases regarding issues of identity and
acceptance. As a result, adolescents are more likely than adults to be
influenced by others, both in terms of how they evaluate their own
behavior and in the sense of conforming to what peers are doing.41
Because a majority of delinquent adolescent behavior occurs in groups,42
peer pressure may exert a powerful counterweight to the societal
commands of the criminal law. Indeed, Moffitt argues that adolescents
prefer to mimic their antisocial peers because they appear to have attained
adult status in many ways.43
Professors Stafford and Warr also argue that peer involvement affects
perceptions of the certainty and severity of sanctions. 4 For example,
the presence of multiple peers during delinquent behavior may heighten
a juvenile's sense of anonymity and his or her sense of invulnerability to
sanction from the justice system. Because some form of delinquent
activity is a part of development for most adolescents 45 and occurs
without legal consequence relatively frequently,' peers may also provide
40. See id. ("It may be harder for an adolescent than for an adult to contemplate
the meaning of a consequence that will be realized 10 to 15 years in the future, because
such a time span is not easily made relevant to adolescent experience.").
41. See Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and
Parents, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 608, 615 (1979) (showing peak peer conformity
at grade 9 between grades 3 and 12); Scott et al., supra note 37, at 230.
42. See Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a
Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981) ("The 'well-known
secret' is this: adolescents commit crimes, as they live their lives, in groups.").
43. See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent
Antisocial Behavior:A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674,687-88 (1993)
(noting that adolescents who want "to prove their maturity" are likely to emulate "life-
course-persistents" [criminal perpetrators] because the latter's lifestyle resembles
adulthood more than childhood).
44. See Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and
Specific Deterrence, 30 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 123, 132 (1993) ("[A]n intelligent
offender might be tempted to draw stronger conclusions about the certainty and severity
of punishment from the cumulative experiences of friends than from his or her own
relatively narrow life experiences.").
45. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 43, at 675 (concluding that participation in
delinquency is "a normal part of teen life").
46. Huizinga and Elliott concluded that only 24 % -of juveniles who committed
offenses for which they could have been arrested were in fact arrested. See David
Huizinga & Delbert S. Elliott, Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and
ArrestRates by Race, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 208-09 (1987). Another commentator
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"indirect" experience that punishment is neither certain nor swift in most
circumstances.
A final consideration in gauging relative deterrability is that an
adolescent's position in society is different from that of an adult.
Referred to as the "maturity gap,""7 this difference stems from the fact
that, although adolescents have often reached biological maturity, they
have not yet been ascribed the traditional mantle of social responsibility
and authority conveyed by adult status and roles. This status differential
has two implications. First, adolescent autonomy is more restricted than
that of adults, with less freedom to engage in "socially acceptable" outlets
for risky behavior such as legal gambling, drinking, and risky financial
investments. Second, minors are less integrated into the prosocial
responsibilities, roles, and relationships of adulthood."
This reduced "stake in life," like adolescents' attitude toward risk
and their foreshortened temporal perspective, may lead them to feel they
have less to lose than adults. Specifically, the "informal" costs and
sanctions associated with deterrence may be weakened. Informal costs (as
opposed to the formal costs of deterrence such as imprisonment) can be
described in terms of commitment, attachment, and stigma.49
Commitment costs relate to a person's stake in conformity and future
achievement. Attachment costs occur through a loss of relationships in
the social network. The stigma of arrest and prosecution may damage a
person's reputation in the community. Deterrence works better if it raises
the risks of incurring these informal costs. If adolescents have less stake
in the future and relationships, with fewer formal social roles to risk, then
the deterrent effects of these informal costs are diminished. Stated
another way, adolescents have had less exposure to the external
constraints that create internal controls.
This analysis of developmental concepts suggests that a criminal
justice system based primarily on deterrence is not as well suited to
respond to adolescent offenders as it is to adult offenders. Bolstering this
conclusion is the well-documented fact that criminal behavior peaks
during mid- to late adolescence and then begins to decline without further
concluded, based on a review of self-report studies of juveniles, that "[t]here is
considerable undetected delinquency, and police apprehension is low, probably less than
10 percent." CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 46 (4th ed. 1997).
47. Moffitt, supra note 43, at 674.
48. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING:
PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 21 (1993) (stating that "changes that
strengthen social bonds to society in adulthood will lead to less crime and deviance").
49. See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General
Deterrence: A Critical RevieW, 20 L. & Soc'Y REV. 545, 561-66 (1986).
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intervention.' Studies of delinquency also report that most delinquent
behavior is not planned, but rather a spur-of-the-moment decision. All
of this evidence supports the proposition that children are less deterrable
than adults.
This is not to suggest that children should be excused for their
criminal conduct. Like adult sex offenders, most children who commit
criminal acts intend them and understand that others consider their actions
to be wrong. Furthermore, like most adult sex offenders, most children
are able to control their conduct in the minimal sense of being able to
choose between options; adolescent offenders generally are capable of
acting in a lawful manner at the time of the offense and decide not to do
so. 52  But, also like many sex offenders, children are relatively
unaffected by the prospect of punishment compared to most adults.
Although the etiology of this undeterrability is quite different in the two
cases, both juvenile and sex offenders are thus eligible for the preventive
regime contemplated by Hendricks.
3. WHY HENDRICKS MAKES MORE SENSE FOR CHILDREN
THAN FOR ADULTS
That the preventive regime autliorized by Hendricks may be
applicable to children as well as some categories of adults does not mean
it should be adopted. As noted earlier, such a regime can be criticized
on a number of grounds. These can be reduced to three essential
complaints.
First, the Hendricks regime undermines the autonomy premise upon
which the criminal justice system and our entire society is built. Whether
or not our actions are determined, it is morally and practically important
50. See, e.g., Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of
Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552 (1983); Edward P. Mulvey & John F. LaRosa, Jr.,
Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent Development, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212
(1986).
51. See JAMES F. SHORT, JR. & FRED L. STRODTBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND
GANG DELINQUENCY 248-65 (1965); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., FROM BOY TO
MAN, FROM DELINQUENCY TO CRIME 125 (1987). See generally Charles W. Thomas &
Donna M. Bishop, The Effect of Formal and Informal Sanctions on Delinquency: A
Longitudinal Comparison of Labeling and Deterrence Theories, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1222, 1244 (1984) (stating that "the ability of formal or informal sanctions
to modify delinquency, involvement, self-conceptions, or perceptions of risk in the fashion
predicted by either deterrence theory or labeling theory finds little or no support in our
analysis").
52. See Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52-55 (1998).
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to treat people as if they are responsible moral agents. 3 Dangerousness
statutes limited to the incapacitation of those with extreme cognitive or
volitional impairment do not threaten this imperative because they
preventively confine only those who have been adjudged legally non-
responsible. But preventive schemes like those endorsed in Hendricks
send a different message. The more categories of people that are
confined based on what they might do rather than what they have done,
the greater the insult to the moral claim that individuals control their fate
and actions. On a more practical level, the criminal justice system begins
to "lose[ ] its ability to claim that offenders deserve the sentences they
get. . . . [and thus] dilutes its ability to induce personal shame and to
instigate social condemnation."I
A second reason to distrust a Hendricks regime is the familiar charge
that the predictions upon which such a system rests are inherently
unreliable.55 While the culpability assessments required by a retributive
system are difficult, at least the underlying behavior is an objective fact
that can be proven and allows the inference of mental state. A predictive
judgment does just the opposite: It relies in large part on speculation
about present and future mental state to figure out whether antisocial
behavior will occur. That task seems harder as a conceptual matter, and
has proven quite difficult in practice.
Difficulties of prediction might not be particularly bothersome if the
intervention based on such a prediction were relatively unintrusive.
However, the typical response to someone labeled a sexual predator is
incarceration. Furthermore, because the "mental abnormality" that leads
to commitment is very resistant to change, a person found to be a sexual
predator will have a hard time shaking off the label. Consequently,
53. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28-53, 180-
83 (1968).
54. Paul H. Robinson, A Failure of Moral Conviction?, 117 PUB. INTEREST 40,
44 (1994). For a more extended discussion of these points, see Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND
MENTAL DISORDER supra note 7, at 360, 362-73.
55. The most recent research, using the most refined methodology and examining
the best prediction techniques, suggests that the false positive rate will be between 40 and
50% among groups of persons charged with crime. See Deidre Klassen & William A.
O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health
Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 152 (1988) (40%); Charles W. Lidz et al.,
The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007, 1007 (1993) (45 %);
Diana Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two-Year Follow-up of 408
Pre-Trial Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983) (43%).
Note, however, that for certain populations (e.g., multiple offenders) that rate might drop
precipitously and that persistent methodological problems with all of these studies may
exaggerate the false positive rate. See Slobogin, supra note 54, at 372-73.
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commitment under these statutes is prolonged, perhaps even
permanent.56
Contrary to the Court's insinuation in Hendricks, the breadth of a
dangerousness standard is not substantially minimized by adding a
requirement that the subject be "unable to control adequately" the
antisocial behavior. To many laypeople and even many judges, the latter
phrase might encompass anyone who commits a crime, or at least anyone
who commits two crimes. When one puts this broad construction of
volitional impairment together with the recent push toward making
incapacitation the most important goal of the criminal justice system,57
the potential for abuse becomes significant.
A third reason to be reticent about a Hendricks regime is that all but
the least ambitious versions of it would probably be enormously
expensive. For instance, the State of Illinois estimated that implementing
a sexual predator statute in that state would cost more than one billion
dollars over a ten-year period.58 The key policy question about such
expenditures is not whether they improve public safety through
incapacitation or rehabilitation of sex offenders; surely they buy some
added protection. But compared to what? The central concern ought to
be whether the amount of money spent on such programs diverts support
from other more effective preventive mechanisms. The assertion that they
do is best captured by a popular bumper sticker: Build more schools, not
more prisons.
The arguments against a Hendricks regime are substantial. When
applied in the juvenile context, however, the persuasiveness of each is
significantly diminished. For example, the argument that a Hendricks
regime would undermine society's presumption of individual autonomy
loses virtually all of its force in the juvenile setting. While most children
can justly be held criminally responsible for their criminal actions, the
56. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., Survey
of the States: Laws/Legislation for the Commitment of Sex Offenders, in SEXUAL
PREDATOR LEGISLATION TOOL KIT (1997) ("Very few committed offenders are released
(657 offenders currently committed nationally, fewer than 10 discharged in the last 12
months)."); Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 205-06 (1996) (stating that
not one of 75 sex offenders committed to Minnesota's program since 1975 has been
released entirely, although six are on conditional release).
57. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3 (1995) ("Incapacitation now serves as
the principal justification for imprisonment in American criminal justice: offenders are
imprisoned in the United States to restrain them physically from offending again while
they are confined.").
58. See John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 468, 500 (1998).
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research already reported, as well as other research on youths' judgmental
capacities, suggests that on the autonomy scale children fall somewhere
between adults with severe mental illness and non-mentally ill adults."
More importantly, there is a widespread perception that children are less
autonomous than adults. Thus, treatment of children as relatively non-
autonomous does not significantly undercut society's belief in free will or
dilute its ability to socially condemn adult offenders.
A similar response can be made to the argument that a Hendricks
regime rests on inherently unreliable predictions. A system that has
jurisdiction only over children, as is true with current juvenile courts, is
not vulnerable to the long-term abuse that will inevitably afflict a
Hendricks regime. A "junior model" of that regime will not avoid
erroneous interventions, but because intervention within the juvenile
system is inherently time-limited, de facto life sentences of the type that
could routinely occur under a Hendricks statute are not possible.
Additionally, as will be discussed below, the juvenile system should be
oriented toward risk management and rehabilitation rather than mere
incapacitation, which should significantly curtail deprivations of liberty,
erroneous or not.
As to the third, fiscal criticism of the Hendricks model, nothing can
be said if one believes attempts to rehabilitate offenders are a waste of
money. If, on the other hand, rehabilitative efforts can work, as is
argued here, ° they are best directed at people in their early years, for
at least two reasons. First, the overall crime rate will be reduced because
individuals will end their antisocial conduct earlier. Second, individuals
will be crime-free for a longer period of time, allowing more productive
lives on other fronts. A third intuitively appealing reason for such a
position-that children are less set in their ways than adults and thus
easier to, rehabilitate-is based on an unproven empirical assumption.
However, there is some indirect support for that assumption; 61 at least,
there is little doubt that adolescents are more treatable than the average
offender committed under sexual predator laws authorized by
59. For the best overall treatment of children's maturity as it relates to criminal
responsibility, see Scott & Grisso, supra note 16.
60. See infra Part IV.B.
61. Two reviews of the literature suggest that early childhood intervention is
effective both in terms of reducing recidivism and in terms of cost-effectiveness, although
no direct comparisons with adult programs were made. See Hirokazu Yoshikawa,
Prevention as Cumulative Protection: Effects of Early Family Support and Education on
Chronic Delinquency andIts Risks, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 28 (1994); Edward Zigler et al.,
Early Childhood Intervention: A Promising Preventative for Juvenile Delinquency, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 997, 1002 (1992).
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Hendricks.' If these assertions are true then, as the bumper-sticker
slogan suggests, a juvenile preventive system is much more cost-effective
than an adult one.
D. Summary
The new criminal paradigm contemplated by Hendricks, although
suspect in its application to adults, provides a coherent and defensible
justification for a preventive juvenile justice system. Because children are
less deterrable than adults, they can be subject to preventive intervention.
Because children are perceived as less autonomous than adults, because
the juvenile court has limited jurisdiction, and because the treatment of
youth is relatively cost-effective, a preventive system applied to juveniles
does not have the serious shortcomings associated with its application in
the adult context.
As may have been gathered, a Hendricks-type preventive system in
the juvenile setting is identical, at least in broad outline, to the system
contemplated by many of those who created the juvenile court.
Intervention under such a regime would be rehabilitation-oriented and
aimed at preventing recidivism. We do not claim to be inventing a new
juvenile system, but merely providing a stronger conceptual basis for its
existence.
At the same time, specific aspects of a preventive model based on the
relative undeterrability rationale are worth elaboration. Adoption of a
Hendricks regime for children has implications for both juvenile court
jurisdiction and juvenile dispositions that differ not just from a
punishment-oriented system, but also from some of the traditional forms
of juvenile justice. The rest of this Article explores these implications.
III. JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER A PREVENTIVE REGIME
Who should be subject to a separate juvenile system based on a
Hendricks prevention rationale? Traditionally, jurisdiction of the juvenile
court ended at age eighteen, with children close to that age (i.e., ages
fifteen through seventeen) transferred to adult court if they were
considered unamenable to treatment. More recently, some states have
lowered the maximum age for act jurisdiction and the minimum age for
62. As Dr. Wettstein points out, many of those committed as sexual predators will
be the least treatable offenders who likely failed to participate or benefit from early
attempts at treatment and will have persistently and pervasively denied their sexual
offending during their years in prison. See Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric
Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 597, 616-17 (1992).
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transfer eligibility, and the transfer decision now is focused more on
culpability than treatability.Y In a Hendricks regime, act and transfer
jurisdiction would revert to the more traditional approaches.
Additionally, dangerousness would become an explicit criterion for
intervention. At the same time, concerns about our ability to implement
such a system might significantly modify the purely preventive regime
contemplated by Hendricks.
A. The Age Requirement
If relative undeterrability is the rationale for a special regime for
children, the age of eligibility for that regime should end when relative
undeterrability does. Of course, the various traits and circumstances
associated with a significant degree of undeterrability do not disappear
suddenly at a particular age and will vary in strength at different ages for
different people. The research is ambiguous as to when these
characteristics change for most people. At this point in time, all that can
be said is that the traditional cut-off of eighteen would not be inconsistent
with research regarding risk perception, temporal perspective, the effects
of peer pressure, or one's stake in life. Dispositional age, on the other
hand, might extend well beyond eighteen, depending upon the perceived
efficacy of treatment. That issue is addressed later in this Article.
B. The Act Requirement
The statute upheld in Hendricks did not require a recent antisocial act
as a basis for preventive jurisdiction. Such a requirement would
presumably have defeated the purpose of the law, because sex offenders
who have been in prison are unlikely to have committed any sex offenses
there. At the same time, everyone committed under the Kansas law must
at least have been charged with a sex offense at some point, either to
trigger their current sentence or in connection with an incompetency or
insanity finding.' Whether the Hendricks Court would have permitted
preventive detention of someone never charged with a sex offense is
unclear.
63. For a review of developments in juvenile court jurisdiction within the last two
decades, see Mark Soler, Juvenile Justice in the Next Century: Programs or Politics?,
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST., Winter 1996, at 27.
64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1997) (applying commitment procedures
to sex offenders who have completed their sentence, or those charged with sex offenses
who were found incompetent to stand trial, not guilty by reason of insanity or not guilty
because of mental disease or defect).
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As a theoretical matter, a purely preventive regime does not require
proof of an act. The logic discussed earlier would permit the state to
protect itself from truly undeterrable people without having to wait for
any particular conduct. Consistent with this logic, most states do not
require proof of an overt act in connection with the civil commitment of
people with mental illness.'
As noted earlier, however, sex offenders are not as undeterrable as
those with severe mental illness. Nor are children. The research
described earlier merely suggests children are less likely to be affected by
the prospect of criminal punishment, not that they are oblivious to it.
Thus, the state should not have the authority to forego entirely a threshold
act requirement; using the terminology described earlier in this Article,
the juvenile system should be a preventive hybrid that requires proof of
a culpable act, rather than purely preventive. This approach would make
clear to would-be juvenile miscreants the precise point at which the state
intervenes, a message at least some of them will hear despite youth's
relative lack of attention to such rules.
There are at least two other reasons to require an act as a predicate
for preventive intervention. First, proof of an antisocial act reduces the
potential for mistake by providing evidence useful to the dangerousness
determination.' Second, absent proof of an act, intervention is likely
to appear unfair, both to the juvenile, thus possibly undermining
cooperation with and efficacy of treatment,67 and to society, thereby
undermining the legitimacy and potency of the system as a whole.' 8
Accordingly, even a youth who is likely to commit crime and can be
successfully "treated" should not be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction
without proof of an act the state has identified as a crime.
The most difficult question in this regard concerns the types of acts
that justify intervention. Traditionally, juvenile court jurisdiction
encompassed conduct that was not criminal if committed by adults, such
65. REISNER ET AL., supra note 32, at 679.
66. The mantra of prediction research, still well-accepted, is that the best
predictor of future acts is past acts. See JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71 (1981). The
"anamnestic" approach to prediction also benefits from detailed information about past
criminal acts. See infra note 100.
67. Cf. BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
328-37 (1997) (arguing that voluntary treatment is more likely to be efficacious than
coerced treatment).
68. - See Paul Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous
Blameless Offenders, 83 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 693, 707 (1993) (A society "that
imposes criminal liability on persons that the community regards as not sufficiently
blameworthy risks destroying [the] motive to adhere to the laws...").
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as truancy, incorrigibility and the like.' The fact that these acts do not
necessarily cause a high degree of harm or offense is irrelevant in a
preventive regime; rather, their usefulness as predictors of antisocial
behavior should weigh heavily in determining whether they can be
prerequisites for intervention. Recent research suggests that some types
of low-level antisocial activity, particularly if repeated at an early age,
can be good predictors for later, more serious antisocial activity.7' If
so, intervention might be justified in such cases. Again, however,
intervention should not be equated with some sort of confinement. As
developed below, physical incapacitation should be reserved for only a
narrow category of cases in which there is a high degree of certainty that
violent crime will thereby by prevented.
C. The Dangerousness Requirement
While Hendricks is not clear as to whether proof of an act is
required, it explicitly requires proof of dangerousness. Such proof is
notoriously difficult to obtain, particularly if. dangerousness is
conceptualized as a dichotomous decision (i.e., likely to recidivate versus
not likely to recidivate).7" Moreover, because the science of prediction
is so new, specifying the criteria that justify a finding of dangerousness
sufficiently objectively to permit meaningful review is impossible in many
cases.
The individual cost of this uncertainty is greatest when the person
found dangerous is deprived of liberty. 7' Accordingly, we proffer two
proposals about how the preventive philosophy should be implemented
when the State wants to confine a juvenile. First, physical confinement
ought to occur only if the State provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt
69. See FREDERICK B. SUSSMANN & FREDERIC S. BAUM, LAW OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 12 (3d ed 1968) (listing offenses such as "habitually truant,"
"incorrigible," "begging," visiting gaming places, and using vile language in a public
place).
70. See Moffitt, supra note 43, at 678 (stating that life-course-persistent offenders
are far more likely "adolescent-limited" offenders to have a long history of troublesome
childhood behavior, such as behavioral problems in school).
71. Once a decision is made to intervene based on a prediction of dangerousness,
however, dichotomous decisionmaking should be minimized in favor of a risk management
approach. See infra Part IV.
72. In this context, we make no distinction between prisons, jails, "reform
schools," and other institutions that restrain freedom on a 24-hour basis. While there are
clearly differences in degree among these institutions, they all significantly restrict
freedom and separate the person from his or her community. See generally J. Herbie
DiFonzo, Deprived of "Fatal Liberty": The Rhetoric of Child Saving and the Reality of
Juvenile Incarceration, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 855 (1995).
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that the juvenile will commit a serious crime if not incarcerated. 3
Second, the maximum length of the confinement should not exceed a set
period (say, two years) or the duration of juvenile court jurisdiction,
whichever is shortest.
The reasonable doubt proposal is, on its face, inconsistent with
Supreme Court doctrine. While it tracks the requirements of the statute
upheld in Hendricks,74 it appears to run counter to both Addington v.
Texas75 and Jones v. United States.76 Addington held that civil
commitment is permissible on mere clear and convincing proof,7 and
Jones held that commitment of those found insane need not meet even the
latter level of proof.7" Jones also held that predictions of nonviolent
behavior are sufficient cause for commitment. 79
Upon closer inspection, however, these decisions can be
distinguished from the juvenile context. The Jones standard of proof
holding is clearly inapplicable to the juvenile setting, for the same reason
it is inapplicable in civil commitment. If there is any rationale for
distinguishing Jones from Addington and permitting a lower standard of
proof for insanity acquittals than for those subjected to civil commitment,
it is that the State's interest in presuming its citizens are autonomous
actors, which offsets its interest in public safety in the civil commitment
context, does not exist in the post-acquittal context, given the finding of
insanity.' In this regard, the juvenile justice system is more like civil
73. A similar proposal has been made in connection with civil commitment of
those with mental illness. See Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a
Dangerous Definition, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1999).
74. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1997) (requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually violent predator).
75. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
76. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
77. See 441 U.S. at 432-33.
78. Jones upheld automatic commitment of a person found insane immediately
following the verdict, see 463 U.S. at 363-66, and strongly implied that, at subsequent
review hearings, the burden may be placed on the acquittee to prove nondangerousness
by a preponderance of the evidence. See James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the
Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 961, 972 (1986).
79. See 463 U.S. at 365 ("This Court never has held that 'violence,' however that
term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment.").
80. See Warren J. Ingber, Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment
and Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 281, 301-02, 309 (1982). The Court's explanation in Jones for the differing
standards of proof in civil and criminal commitment was that proof of a criminal act at
trial reduced the risk that a subsequent finding of dangerousness in connection with
criminal commitment would be wrong. See 463 U.S. at 363-66. That analysis is
seriously flawed, for a number of reasons. See Ellis, supra note 78, at 969-75.
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commitment: it must presume the autonomy of its subjects. Thus,
Addington sets the minimum standard of proof threshold for the juvenile
system. Yet even Addington's clear and convincing standard is
insufficient in the latter context, because the detention associated with
civil commitment is likely to be much shorter than juvenile detention. 1
Given the significantly greater liberty interest involved, preventive
incapacitation in the juvenile system should require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
For similar reasons, Jones's second holding, concerning the propriety
of commitment based on a nonviolent act, is also irrelevant in the juvenile
context. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that Jones has limited
applicability in situations that do not involve people with mental illness.
As Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha v. Louisiand2 suggested,
the State should not be able to confine non-mentally ill people on
dangerousness grounds "where the only evidence of dangerousness is that
the acquittee committed a nonviolent or relatively minor crime."I 3 In
other words, where the pure preventive model is not applicable,
confinement should be limited to those likely to commit violent or other
serious crimes, because only then does the intervention fit the risk.
An added justification for requiring proof of serious future criminal
activity beyond a reasonable doubt in the juvenile context is the likelihood
that the recidivism of children who are institutionalized will be much
higher than that of children who are not.' The State's interest in
preventing crime would hardly be met by increasing its likelihood, yet
that may well be the result of relaxed proof requirements. At the same
time, in cases where confinement is not sought, the proof of
81. The advent of antipsychotic medication in the 1950s has drastically shortened
the average commitment to a matter of weeks. The average length of stay in the hospital
for the majority of patients was under 90 days even in the 1970s, before the advent of
better drugs and managed care shortened the stay even more, to less than a month. See
REISNER ET AL., supra note 32, at 778.
82. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
83. 1d. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurring vote was
necessary to reach the result in Foucha.
84. A review of research (much of it admittedly methodologically flawed) suggests
that deterrence-based interventions for juveniles not only do not reduce recidivism but may
have iatrogenic effects of increasing recidivism by almost 30% over similarly situated
comparison groups. See Mark W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-
Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION:
A CASEBOOK 83, 124 (Thomas Cook ed., 1992); see also John M. Rector, Foreword to
DONNA MARTIN HAMPARIAN ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEW: A STUDY OF DANGEROUS
JUVENILE OFFENDERS at xvii (1978); LYLE W. SHANNON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS: A
SUMMARY 15 (1982), reported in BARTOLLAS, supra note 46, at 41-43.
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dangerousness required can be considerably less, both in terms of the
standard of proof and the type of antisocial conduct predicted.
The second proposed limitation on institutionalization-a set duration
for confinement-stems from at least three considerations. First, of
course, it minimizes the harm caused by an erroneous prediction.
Second, a time limit known to the offender avoids the demoralization that
can occur in an indeterminate regime.85 Third, such a limit can have a
positive therapeutic effect because it gives the juvenile a specific
behavioral goal to achieve (that is, no antisocial activity within the
specified period in order to obtain release).86
Recall that the Hendricks majority found dangerousness alone to be
an insufficient justification for commitment; some sort of volitional
dysfunction must also be present. While children as a class exhibit such
dysfunction, requiring proof of it in individual cases would be a
meaningless limitation. If proof of dangerousness is difficult, proof of
volitional dysfunction is nearly impossible. Indeed, many have argued
that even proving the extreme disability encompassed by the volitional
prong of the insanity defense (often colloquialized as the irresistible
impulse doctrine) is an incoherent exercise, and in any event is not
feasible scientifically. 7 If so, it is futile to carry out the task demanded
by a Hendricks regime: the identification of non-insane juveniles who
nonetheless have compromised volition.
Even if the "semi-irresistible" impulse apparently contemplated by
Hendricks can be addressed meaningfully, individualized assessments of
volitionality would be counterproductive because they would destroy the
coherence of an independent juvenile. justice system; children who are
similar in terms of rehabilitative needs will nonetheless end up in different
systems because of perceived differences in behavioral controls. Those
who advocate a separate juvenile court predicated on the greater
immaturity or malleability of children base that argument on the traits of
85. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 10, at 31 (speaking of the "agonies of
uncertainty" and concluding that "[niot surprisingly, many prisoners regard the
indeterminate sentence as perhaps the worst feature of prison existence").
86. This is a well-known method of behavior management that harnesses
principles of psychology to reduce risk. See WINICK, supra note 67, at ch. 4.
87. See, e.g., ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 174 (1991) ("In short, volitional clauses..
• provide unsatisfactory NGRI standards because they are either unnecessary and
irrelevant or they are vacuous."); Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity
Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197 (1983) (stating "the exculpation of pyromaniacs [and
other individuals with so-called impulse disorders] would be out of touch with commonly
shared moral intuitions"); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, '142 U. PA. L. REV.
1587, 1595-99 (1994) (stating that most claims that lack of control is exculpatory are
conceptually and empirically unsupported). . -
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children as a class, despite evidence that individuals within that class can
be as mature or as unchangeable as adults. Along the same lines, a
showing, such as we attempt in this Article, that children as a group are
less deterrable than adults should satisfy the reduced-volition component
of Hendricks.
In sum, given experts' lack of knowledge about human behavior and
criminal conduct, the regime envisioned in Hendricks requires
modification when applied to the juvenile context. Proof of volitional
dysfunction should not be a threshold requirement. On the other hand,
proof that a crime has been committed should be required. Furthermore,
if confinement is sought, proof of dangerousness should meet the
reasonable doubt standard, and any confinement that results should not be
prolonged. If a culpable act is not proven, or if such an act is proven but
dangerousness cannot be, no intervention of any sort should take place.
In practice, commission of most serious and many :minor, crimes will
probably lead to some sort of intervention. But, if the limitations
advocated above are adopted, incapacitative intervention should be
rare,88 and in any event should be of relatively short duration.
D. The Relevance of Treatability
A final issue that could relevant to juvenile court jurisdiction in a
preventive scheme is the rehabilitative potential of the child. In our view,
the State need not make a showing of treatability to justify preventive
intervention against a dangerous youth. However, the State does owe
appropriate resources to a juvenile who is treatable. Furthermore, even
if the State can demonstrate that, despite appropriate treatment, a youth
continues to engage in antisocial behavior, the juvenile should generally
stay within the juvenile system, contrary to the current tendency to
transfer such youth to adult court.
88. A possibly relevant statistic here is that 5-6% of chronic offenders commit
over 50% of juvenile crime. See DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND
CONTROLLING CRIME 50-51 (1986); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN
A BIRTH COHORT 88 (1972).
A fair inquiry at this point is whether proof of dangerousness beyond a reasonable
doubt is possible; one might conclude that confinement under our proposal would be
extremely rare, because such proof is so difficult to come by. For the argument that proof
of dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt is not impossible for certain groups of
chronic offenders, as well as some suggestions for procedural protections in connection
with dangerousness predictions, see Sloboginj supra note 54, at 366-70. In a nutshell, the
argument is that methodological flaws in prediction research have led to underestimations
of our predictive accuracy. At the same time theoretical and actuarial research suggests
that a class of high-offending individuals can be identified.
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1. TREATABILITY AND TREATMENT AS THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
One of the arguments made against the statute at issue in Hendricks
was that it did not premise confinement on treatability. The Supreme
Court apparently rejected this contention, stating at one point that
"incapacitation [alone] may be a legitimate end of the civil law"89 and
at another that "we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State
from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who
nevertheless pose a danger to others."' ° Bruce Winick has contended
that, because the Court believed Hendricks was receiving some sort of
treatment, these statements are dicta.9 It seems more likely, however,
that the Court meant to approve purely incapacitative confinement. As
the majority stated, "it would be of little value to require treatment as a
precondition for civil confinement of the dangerously insane when no
acceptable treatment existed."'
However, the Court did leave open the issue of whether the State
must provide treatment to those who are treatable. 9 The best argument
for such an obligation flows from the idea that deprivation of a
fundamental right such as liberty must take place in the least drastic way
possible.' Under this theory, treatment that reduces the scope of the
State's intervention should be forthcoming. Although the Supreme Court
has apparently rejected least restrictive alternative analysis in deciding
which treatment must be provided,' the Court has yet to address
89. 521 U.S. at 365-66.
90. Id. at 366.
91. See Winick, supra note 34, at 531.
92. 521 U.S. at 366.
93. In justifying its decision, the majority emphasized that Hendricks was placed
in a unit segregated from the general prison population and received some treatment. See
id. at 367-68. The majority also quoted its statement in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986), that "the State serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually
dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide
psychiatric care and treatment." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 n.4; see also Cornwell,
supra note 7, at 406.
94. This theory was first proposed by Roy G. Spece, in Preserving the Right to
Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right
to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 33-46 (1978). It derives from the Supreme
Court's First Amendment cases holding that state interference with the freedoms of speech
and press must be carried out in the least drastic manner possible. See, e.g., Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Surely, liberty is a more fundamental interest than
speech and press.
95. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) ("It is not appropriate
for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have
been made.") (citation omitted). But see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
(appearing to require less intrusive alternative analysis in the context of forcibly
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whether that theory bolsters a right to treatment in the first instance.
Indeed, the Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo,' commonly
thought to be a conservative take on the right to treatment, explicitly
states that involuntarily committed patients are entitled to the care
necessary to prevent unnecessary restraint.' This holding could easily
be parlayed into a robust right to any treatment necessary to reduce
prolonged confinement. Thus, while the State should not need to prove
a juvenile is treatable in order to subject him or her to preventive
intervention, it may have to release a treatable juvenile who is not
provided treatment aimed at reducing recidivism.
Note that this "least restrictive alternative" theory of treatment is
much stronger when State intervention is preventive as opposed to
retributive in nature. Under a purely retributive model, the length of
sentence is set according to the nature of the offense and the offender's
culpability. The fact that treatment might reduce the offender's
dangerousness is irrelevant. Under a preventive model, by contrast,
treatment may well determine the length of disposition and therefore
should be provided by the State.
2. UNTREATABILITY AS AN EXCLUSIONARY CRITERION
What of the juvenile who is provided treatment but who does not
desist in his or her criminal behavior? The traditional juvenile court
would transfer such juveniles to adult court, after finding them
"unamenable to treatment." That tradition continues today, but transfer
can be based on a host of other factors as well, virtually all of which
appear to relate to the perceived culpability of the youth. In many states,
statutes explicitly require, regardless of treatability, transfer of children
who commit certain crimes or have a certain number of prior
convictions.98 Even where amenability to treatment remains an issue as
a statutory matter, courts often analyze the issue in a way that suggests
that culpability, not treatability, is their primary concern. For instance,
two recent reviews of caselaw indicate that courts tend to base transfer
decisions predominately on the seriousness of the offense, the number of
prior offenses, and the length of time remaining for juvenile court
administering medication to restore competency to stand trial).
96. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
97. See 457 U.S. at 319 (holding "respondent's liberty interests require the State
to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure... freedom from undue
restraint").
98. See Eric Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States
1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, Juv. & FAM. CT. J.,
Summer 1995, at 17, 24-31 tbls.1, 2.
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jurisdiction,' factors which bear only a tangential relationship to
treatability.
A preventive regime, in contrast, would focus directly on the extent
to which treatment can reduce recidivism. The seriousness of the
triggering offense and any prior offenses are relatively unimportant to
such an inquiry. More important are details about how and why these
offenses were committed, because this information helps determine
whether the person will reoffend and how any future criminal conduct
may be prevented."'° Moreover, offense details are only a small part
of the data that a well-functioning preventive system would require. As
described in Part IV, particularly useful is information about the extent
to which "risk factors" are present and can be treated and the extent to
which such factors have been addressed in the past.
Suppose that as a result of this inquiry the determination is made that
a dangerous juvenile who has committed an offense is untreatable. The
traditional justification for transfer in this situation, apparently, is that the
juvenile court has nothing to offer such a youth. 10' This may be true,
but it does not mean a preventive regime cannot respond in such a
situation. The juvenile system can provide preventive detention of
dangerous, untreatable juveniles as easily as the adult system can.
Furthermore, research strongly suggests such detention is less crimogenic
than incarceration within the adult system."u Finally, to the extent
99. See Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES
(forthcoming 1999) and Frank Zimring, Standards for Transfer to Criminal Court, at 195
(manuscript on file with authors) (stating that "most juvenile waivers fit one of three
problem case profiles:" juveniles who have committed a very serious crime; juveniles with
extensive records; and juveniles close to the age boundary).
100. The "anamnestic" approach, which combines actuarial information with a
detailed description of offense dynamics, is considered the best information source for
prediction.. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS 284 (2d ed. 1997); Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness:
An Argument for Limited Use, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 263, 269 (1988).
101. Alternatively, the justification is that such youth are too dangerous to handle
in the juvenile system. As suggested in the text, however, a juvenile detention center can
handle most violent youth as well as an adult prison can. As to the real reasons transfer
occurs, see supra note 99.
102. See Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court:
Does It Make a Difference?, 43 CRIME & DELINQ., 557 (1997) (a comparison of 2800
youth transferred to adult court and a same-sized sample identified higher short-term and
long-term recidivism rates among the transferred youths); Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative
Advantages of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanction on Recidivism Among Adolescent
Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77, 94-95 (concluding that recidivism rate for
juveniles prosecuted for robbery in criminal court is twice that of those tried in juvenile
court, regardless of sentence type or severity).
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untreatability is a function of the unavailability of resources, resort to the
adult system would be unfair, both because the state is responsible for the
child's "untreatability" and because such resources may become available
at some later point in time.
There may be one instance, however, in which transfer from a
preventive regime is justifiable: When a juvenile has been provided
appropriate treatment and has intentionally spurned it, while at the same
time continuing to reoffend. The rationale for this position is not that the
preventive approach does not work-it can, using incarceration-but
rather that, at some point, punishment is the most appropriate response
because it is truly deserved. When the youth has intentionally failed to
respond to the opportunity to change behavior and attitude, the
justification for application of the just deserts model is at its strongest.
Additionally, preserving a vestige of transfer jurisdiction enhances the
efficacy of the preventive regime because it provides an incentive for
youth to participate in juvenile justice treatment programs and to avoid
reoffending.
While this discussion of treatability, untreatability, and treatment lays
out a systemic framework, it is lacking in context. How do we determine
whether someone is treatable or untreatable? More fundamentally, what
is "treatment?" The final section of this Article provides partial answers
to these questions by exploring in more detail how a preventive system of
juvenile justice intervention would work.
IV. JUVENILE DISPOSITION UNDER A PREVENTIVE REGIME:
RISK MANAGEMENT AND ECOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS
The ultimate test of the preventive model or a hybrid of it is whether
recidivism can be reduced through treatment programs. It must be
conceded that historically the juvenile system has not done particularly
well in this regard. But new developments in the way "treatment" is
conceptualized and in specific types of intervention programs give some
cause for optimism. More specifically, the advent of the risk
management concept and the creation of new, ecological intervention
programs have reinvigorated thinking about preventive techniques. After
explaining these developments and providing some concrete examples of
their implications, this Article revisits the amenability to treatment issues
just discussed and proposes that a presumption of amenability be
recognized as a fundamental aspect of a preventive juvenile system.
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A. Toward a Risk Management Model of Juvenile Justice
In light of the original juvenile court's emphasis on reorienting
wayward children toward "productive" lives," 3 it is important to
emphasize that treatment intervention in a Hendricks regime is aimed
solely at reducing recidivism. This proposition not only flows from the
police power orientation of Hendricks, but also may be required by the
Supreme Court's decision in Donaldson, discussed earlier in this Article.
In Donaldson, the Court expressly held that the State may not coercively
intervene in people's lives "merely to ensure them a living standard
superior to that they enjoy in the private community."' °4 The central
task in constructing an intervention program in a preventive regime,
therefore, is developing a method of differentiating between three classes
of people: those who will not reoffend, those who will reoffend if not
treated, and those who will reoffend regardless of treatment.
Theorists have described two methods of carrying out this task. The
traditional approach is based on a prediction, while the second is called
risk management."t 5 The prediction approach calls for a dichotomous,
up-or-down decision as to whether a person is "dangerous" and treatable.
The prediction ideally is based both on static predictor variables, such as
gender and prior arrests, and dynamic "risk factors," such as current
substance abuse, peer influences, or family problems, that may be subject
to amelioration. The risk management approach is more fluid, in that
there is no single, final decision as to whether a person is or is not
dangerous. Rather, an individual is continually assessed over time in an
effort to assess the ebb and flow of dynamic risk factors, and efforts are
made to "manage" those factors in a way that minimizes recidivism.
The initial determination as to whether a juvenile should be subject
to juvenile court jurisdiction must be based on a dichotomous prediction.
Because virtually every juvenile offender can be associated with at least
one dynamic risk factor, a risk management approach applied at the front
103. Even before the advent of the separate juvenile court, courts talked about
"reformation and training of the child to habits of industry, with a view to his future
usefulness when he shall have been reclaimed to society . . . ." Ex parte Ah Peen, 51
Cal. 280, 281 (1876). Platt has argued that the subsequent development of the juvenile
court was part of a concerted effort to impose middle-class, Protestant, and patriotic
values on an immigrant-laden lower class. See PLATr, supra note 5, at 98. Others argue
that Platt exaggerates this point, but do concede at least some validity to it. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 413-15
(1993).
104. 422 U.S. at 575.
105. For one description of this distinction, see Kirk Heilbrun, Prediction Versus
Management Models Relevant to Risk Assessment: The Importance of Legal Decision-
Making Context, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347 (1997).
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end would mean routine intervention, an outcome obviously inconsistent
with a preference for liberty. Once the decision to intervene is made,
however, the risk management approach is a particularly a useful way of
conceptualizing how a preventive treatment regime should work.
A risk management model of juvenile justice might include the
following features:
(1) Interventions that are comprehensive in scope and
"multisystemic" in nature"° (i.e., focus on the social systems
that affect the juvenile, not just on the juvenile in isolation), and
that vary along a continuum from minimum to maximum
restriction depending on recidivism risk and threat to public
safety;
(2) An Individual Risk Management Plan (IRMP) for each
juvenile, which would seek to match the offender with the type
of intervention that has the greatest likelihood of promoting the
prevention of recidivism while at the same time protecting
public safety;
(3) A risk management team (RMT), which would be
responsible for the IRMPs and monitor the intervention, headed
by a case manager, with input from the child, family members,
school authorities, juvenile justice officials, mental health
experts, vocational counseling professionals, and other interested
parties;
(4) Ongoing, periodic evaluation and modification of the
interventions, based on empirical evidence. To facilitate this
objective, a juvenile justice record-keeping system should be
established, with empirical data on offender characteristics and
the efficacy of various intervention strategies serving as a source
of ongoing feedback for program and policy reform;
(5) Oversight of the management system and record keeping,
either through the juvenile court, or through an administrative
body, the state court administrator's office, or any other
judicial, administrative, or hybrid entity with the competence to
106. See infra Part IV.B for further explication of this term.
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implement and evaluate juvenile justice policy objectives (i.e.,
recidivism reduction and protection of public safety)."07
The following three cases illustrate how this risk management
approach and the preventive regime it would implement would work in
the juvenile context. These three cases are hypothetical, but all represent
typical cases in today's juvenile court.
Jimmy G. Jimmy G. is fifteen. He is the oldest offour children and
a good student in school. His mother, a homemaker throughout most of
Jimmy's childhood, began working part-time as a cashier at the local
supermarket about three years ago, when her husband began having
difficulty holding a job as an auto mechanic because of drinking
problems. Jimmy has never been in serious trouble with the law but lately
he has been staying out all night with a group of rowdy friends. He has
begun drinking heavily on the weekends because it makes him feel more
confident and helps him forget about the horrific abuse that his father has
leveled against him, his mother, and his younger siblings. When Jimmy
was twelve, his father punched him in the mouth at the dinner table and
knocked out his two front teeth because he spilled his glass of cola on the
new light-colored carpet in the dining room. At home, Jimmy is always
very edgy and anxious because he is never sure when he or some other
family member will be beaten by his father during a drunken rage. Every
member of the family has been beaten to the point of requiring medical
treatment, but the causes of the injuries have always been covered up and
hidden from the authorities because all family members fear that they will
be beaten even more severely if they tell on their father. Jimmy feels
responsible for protecting his mother and siblings but is always beaten
himself if he tries to intervene during one of his father's rampages against
another family member. Last week, Jimmy came home from school and
saw his mother sitting on the couch, crying, with a badly broken nose and
a split lip. He saw his father passed out on the easy chair with an
emptied six-pack at his side. Without asking what happened, Jimmy
walked calmly into his bedroom, grabbed a baseball bat from his closet,
returned to the den, and bashed his father's head with the bat. His father
died instantly. When the police arrived, he told the investigating officer
that he had been trying to work up the nerve to confront his father over
the past year or so. He was charged with first degree murder.
107. C. Mark R. Fondacaro et al., PsycholegalResearch in Non-Judicial Settings:
Administrative Law, A New Frontier (1996) (paper presented at the 1996 Biennial
Conference of the American Psychology-Law Society, Hilton Head, South Carolina)
(arguing that administrative rather than judicial approaches are better suited for
implementing forward-looking policy objectives that draw on social and behavioral science
as a guide).
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Jimmy meets the age and act thresholds under the preventive regime
proposed in this Article: He is fifteen and he intentionally killed his
father. Under the proposed regime, a third preliminary question is
whether Jimmy presents a clear danger to others. In gathering
information for the court and the IRMP on this issue, the RMT would,
at a minimum, ask Jimmy about his intentions regarding future violence,
examine his school records for evidence of aggressive behavior, and
interview family members about whether they or others are at risk if
Jimmy is not sent to a secure facility. Because Jimmy has never been in
any serious trouble with the law, and because his aggression to date has
been directed solely at someone who had physically tormented him for
several years and is now dead, such detention is probably not warranted.
Assuming that a secure placement -is not necessary, Jimmy could
probably be managed safely through probationary supervision that would
decrease in frequency and intensity to the extent that he remains law-
abiding. Jimmy exhibits several psychosocial risk factors that would be
addressed as part of his IRMP. He is highly anxious and fearful and may
benefit from social skills training to help him develop nonviolent coping
strategies for dealing with conflict. His excessive drinking and potential
familial risk for alcoholism may be targets of intervention to the extent
that alcohol abuse is judged to be a risk factor for future aggressive
behavior. Likewise, behavioral contracting to avoid socializing with
rowdy and aggressive peers may be an integral component of his IRMP.
Jimmy's success at dealing with these factors, his functioning in the
family, school, peer, and neighborhood contexts, and his compliance with
the law would be assessed on a periodic basis and his IRMP would be
updated and modified accordingly. If he remains law-abiding, juvenile
justice jurisdiction might expire within a few years. If, on the other
hand, Jimmy reoffends, his IRMP would be modified and tailored to
ensure he received the most appropriate intervention at the most
appropriate level of supervision to minimize future recidivism risk.
Contrast this disposition with the treatment of Jimmy under a
retributive regime. The latter system would focus on establishing
Jimmy's culpability for his father's death and calibrating the appropriate
punishment. Conviction would probably result in imprisonment for a
fairly long term. In today's world, that incarceration would probably take
place in an adult institution, where Jimmy's recidivism risk would be
enhanced"~ and his chinces for developing a stake in his own future
would be obliterated.
Charles M. Charles M. is sixteen years old and has been arrested
repeatedly for auto theft. His mother is a single parent who works as a
108. See supra note 102.
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nurse's aide and who always stands by her son when he gets into trouble.
She says and truly believes that he is basically a good kid who is just a
little "mixed up." Charles has been taken into custody repeatedly and has
been in and out of court-ordered treatment programs for years. He was
eventually placed in a group home but "escaped" from the premises on
two separate occasions, each time eventually being apprehended by
police, but not before he had stolen several vehicles on each outing. The
prosecutor is presently petitioning to have him tried as an adult due to his
habitual offending.
Charles M. is a repeat offender whose recidivism risk is very high.
That fact, combined with his previous "escapes" from group homes, make
Charles a candidate for secure detention, perhaps for the full allowable
two-year period we propose, but perhaps for a much shorter period if this
is the first risk management intervention for Charles. During this
confinement, his RMT would conduct a comprehensive risk assessment.
It would look at the nature of his criminal history (e.g., is he joyriding,
vandalizing, or selling the cars he steals?), his mother's past attempts to
monitor his behavior (has she ever attempted to set appropriate limits for
him?), the nature and appropriateness of past treatment programs (is there
any evidence that such treatment programs are effective with young car
thieves?), whether there are positive male role models in Charles' family,
school, or neighborhood, and the extent to which Charles' car thefts have
been tied to his association with delinquent peers.
The RMT's overall goal would be the reintegration of Charles into
his community, either with his family or on his own, equipped with the
vocational or educational skills necessary to develop a stake in his own
future. Toward that goal, the RMT would assess Charles' recidivism risk
on a periodic basis, both while he is in confinement and once he is out.
Unless Charles showed complete unwillingness to respond positively to
these efforts, he would remain in the juvenile justice system, in contrast
to the likely outcome under a retributive system, which would probably
treat him like an adult from the outset.109
Billy B. Billy B. is nine years old and has been a difficult child from
birth. He cried incessantly as an infant and was especially difficult to
console. Both of his parents like him least of their three children. He
never listens to his parents' reprimands and is usually a bully toward
smaller and younger children. He is very unpopular at school because
of his bullying and has no friends his own age. For the past week he has
109. See David A. Harris, The Criminal Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile Justice
System, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 751, 756-61 (1995), from which this case is taken. Even
in a technically rehabilitation-oriented system, Charles was sentenced to training camp at
the time recounted in the excerpt and eventually ended up in an adult detention center.
See id. at 761.
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been skipping school and taking his BB gun into the woods near his
house, shooting at birds, frogs, and other small animals. He would like
to shoot his neighbors' cat, but they never let it out of their yard. The
school principal calls Billy's mother and informs her that Billy has not
been attending school.
Because he has not committed a criminal offense, Billy B. would
probably not be subject to delinquency jurisdiction under either a
preventive or a punishment-oriented regime. If, on the other hand, Billy
did shoot and kill his neighbor's cat, he would be eligible for intervention
under either system.
The similarity between the systems would end there, however. In a
retributive regime, the assessment would be backward-looking, focusing
on whether Billy intended to kill the cat and whether he has the mental
capacity to be held accountable for his acts. The nature and duration of
the punishment would presumably be minimal, little more than a slap on
the wrist. Under a risk management regime, by'contrast, alarm bells
would go off, not so much because he killed the cat, but because his
difficult temperament, bullying, peer rejection, cruelty to animals, and
truancy are all highly predictive of an intractable, life course of
delinquency, especially if left untreated. Considerable empirical evidence
indicates that early intervention with such high-risk youngsters may have
a significant impact on reducing risk for later juvenile delinquency and
even adult crime. '10
This case presents the greatest contrast between the two systems. A
preventive risk management regime would invest considerable resources
in children like Billy B., whereas a punishment regime would be
relatively unconcerned with him.
B. Will It Work? The Need for Ecological Intervention
A skeptic may dismiss these illustrations, which all depend heavily
on effective preventive interventions, as "soft" or unrealistic. Certainly,
the history of treatment in the juvenile justice system has not been a
happy one."' What has changed?
110. See Moffitt, supra note 43, at 684.
111. The most famous statement to this effect comes from Justice Fortas' opinion
for the Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966):
[S]tudies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance [of the juvenile court] measures well enough against
theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the
reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence
that some juvenile courts ... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to
perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity,
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Probably the most important new development in treatment programs
is the focus on ecological intervention, an approach which, as the above
cases illustrate, the risk management approach endorses and tries to
implement." 2 The underlying assumption of the ecological focus is that
human behavior involves an ongoing and dynamic interaction between the
individual and aspects of the social environment.1 3  In the individual
realm, youngsters may have, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral skills
or deficits that are tied to recidivism risk." 4 In the social realm, a
youngster's social context at the micro-level (family, peer, school), meso-
level (family/peer interface, family/school interface) and macro-level
(community, juvenile justice system) provide resources and strains that
may be linked to recidivism risk." 5 Antisocial behavior, ecological
theory assumes, is rarely the result of just one of these domains.
The ecological approach also recognizes that the nature of the
relationship between the individual and the social context is ongoing and
that influences are reciprocal. For example, a child reared in a family
environment characterized by high levels of conflict and low levels of
support may develop problems with anger control, impulsiveness, and
empathy and be at increased risk of engaging in aggressive behavior
outside the family context. On the other hand, a child with an irritable
at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.
Id. at 555-56.
112. See URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN 3-42 (1979) (arguing that efforts to understand
and change human behavior must take into consideration the interrelated social contexts
in which behavior occurs).
113. See id.; see also Mark Fondacaro & Shelly Jackson, The Legal and
Psychosocial Context of Family Violence: Toward a Social Ecological Analysis, 21 LAW
& POL'Y 91, 96-97 (1999).
114. See Aaron T. Ebata & Rudolf H. Moos, Coping and Adjustment in Distressed
and Healthy Adolescents, 12 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 33, 47-49 (1991)
(demonstrating that delinquent adolescents with behavior problems are more likely to cope
with life stressors by cognitive avoidance responses-trying not to think about the
problem-and emotional discharge responses-letting their feelings out-than are
"healthy" adolescents).
115. See id.; see also Denise Daniels & Rudolf H. Moos, Assessing Life Stressors
and Social Resources Among Adolescents: Applications to Depressed Youth, 5 J.
ADOLESCENT RES. 268 (1990) (demonstrating that delinquent adolescents are more likely
to experience negative life events and have more school and home stressors than "healthy"
adolescents).
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and impulsive disposition may fuel family conflict, which in turn may
erode family bonds and contribute to risk for delinquent conduct. 16
From these observations, it follows that attempts to reduce antisocial
behavior must also be ecological in focus. Scott Henggeler and his
colleagues provide one example of the efficacy of this approach. Relying
on a social-ecological framework, they developed Multisystemic Therapy
-(MST), which is aimed at reducing recidivism risk and decreasing rates
of secure detention and out-of-home placement in chronic, violent juvenile
offenders in a cost-effective manner." 7  MST is primarily a family-
based intervention that attempts to change how juveniles function in
various settings including home, school, peer, and neighborhood
environments."' Therapists are assigned small caseloads (four to six
families) so they can work intensively with offenders and their families
over a relatively short period of time (approximately four months). The
therapist delivers services in the juvenile's home and other natural settings
(e.g., the offender's school or neighborhood) to increase the chances that
behavioral change will endure and generalize across settings.
Interventions are tailored to the individual case and may involve
improving parental monitoring and the quality of parent/adolescent
relations, encouraging association with positive adult role models and
peers who are engaged in prosocial activities, decreasing contact with
delinquent peers, and improving performance in school or at work. The
youth's functioning is monitored on an ongoing basis. "9
Empirical studies have demonstrated that MST reduces long-term
recidivism rates in comparison to control groups by twenty-five to seventy
percent, 2° a very impressive result.'' MST also has been shown to
116. See Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family
Disputes: A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning in Late
Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101, 115-116 (1998).
117. See SCOTr W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3-20 (1998).
118. See Multisystemic Therapy: An Overview (visited Mar. 19, 1999)
< http://www.sc.edu/ifis/MSTfact.html >.
119. See Multisystemic Therapy: How Is It Done? (visited Mar. 19, 1999)
< http://www.sc.edu/ifis/MSTfact2.htmI) >.
120. See Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic
Treatment: Long-Term Followup to a Clinical Trial with Serious Juvenile Offenders, 2 J.
CHILD & FAM. STUD. 283 (1993); see also David C. Tate et al., Violent Juvenile
Delinquents: Treatment Effectiveness and Implications for Future Action, 50 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 777, 779 (1995).
121. For instance, the South Carolina Department of Youth Services has estimated
that a reduction in adult recidivism by juvenile probationers from 29% to 25% would
result in savings equivalent to one-half of the entire budget of the state's juvenile justice
system. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 160 (1995).
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be highly cost-effective. For example, in comparison to boot camps,
MST provided a $29,000 net gain in decreased costs."2 This kind of
intervention, whether or not it takes place under the aegis of the juvenile
justice system,"2 can provide efficient prevention without resorting to
prolonged and counterproductive incapacitative punishment.
C. The Amenability to Treatment Issue Revisited
As the foregoing sections demonstrate, a preventive system relying
on risk management and an ecological approach to reduction of recidivism
endorses an extremely broad view of treatment. According to this view,
virtually everyone is "treatable," at least as an initial matter. Only
someone who continues to reoffend (or provides strong indications of a
willingness to reoffend), despite prolonged exposure to such a system,
might be considered untreatable. In short, amenability is presumed.
These characteristics of the proposed system have two implications
for the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. First, even if act jurisdiction
ends at age eighteen, dispositional jurisdiction should extend well beyond
that age. The monitoring of risk factors and ecological interventions can
take years. Of course, if a person over the age of eighteen reoffends, the
adult system may exert jurisdiction over any prosecution that takes place.
But if risk management can potentially prevent a sixteen- or seventeen-
year-old from reoffending, it should be given a chance to do so, rather
than arbitrarily end at age eighteen. Consistent with this approach, many
states extend dispositional jurisdiction to twenty-one or even further into
the twenties.124
The second implication of a broad definition of treatability is that
very few juveniles should be considered eligible for transfer to adult
court. As suggested earlier, a youth who has offended after
demonstrating an unwillingness to participate in treatment programs could
justifiably be tried under a retributive model. The foregoing discussion
should have made clear, however, that resistance to involvement in
122. See Multisystemic Therapy: Clinical Outcomes and Cost Savings (visited Mar.
19, 1999) <http://www.sc.edu/ifis/MSTfact3.html>.
123. For other accounts of the ecological approach in the related family law area
implemented by "managerial judges" in specialized courts, see Barbara A. Babb,
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint
to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469 (1998); Barbara A. Babb,
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence:Application of an Ecological
and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775 (1997).
124. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTION, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 15 (1996). According to the
Department of Justice, the typical dispositional jurisdiction ends at age 21, but California,
Oregon, and Wisconsin extend that jurisdiction to 25 years of age. See id.
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rehabilitation must be evaluated across contexts and over time. Youths
who are initially quite reluctant and uncooperative may become more
willing and invested in their own treatment once they begin participating
in an intervention program that challenges their negative preconceptions
about "therapy" and provides them with increasing opportunities to
participate in their own rehabilitation planning."Z Accordingly, transfer
based on the retributive rationale outlined here should be a rare event.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional juvenile court, focused on rehabilitation and "child-
saving," was premised primarily on a parens patriae notion of State
power. " Because of juveniles' immaturity and greater treatability, this
theory posited, the State could forego the substantive and procedural
requirements associated with the adult system of criminal punishment. As
an historical and conceptual matter, however, the parens patriae power
justifies intervention only for the good of the subject, not for society as
a whole. "z  From the outset, then, the image of the juvenile
delinquency system as a manifestation of the State acting as "parent" was
an implausible one.
This Article has argued that a much more persuasive reason for
retaining a rehabilitation-oriented system for juveniles can be found by
looking at the police power of the State, specifically its power to
intervene to prevent harm by those who are relatively unaffected by the
prospects of criminal punishment. 1 This Article laid out some of the
125. See Henggeler et al., supra note 120, at 284.
126. "Under the guise of parens patriae, the juvenile court emphasized treatment,
supervision, and control rather than punishment." Feld, supra note 1, at 71.
127. As the Supreme Court stated in Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251
(1972):
The concept of parens patriae is derived from the English constitutional
system. As the system developed from its feudal beginnings, the King
retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as the "royal
prerogative." These powers and duties were said to be exercised by the King
in his capacity ... as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for
themselves. For example, Blackstone refers to the sovereign or his
representative as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics," and
as the superintendent of "all charitable uses in the kingdom." In the United
States, the "royal prerogative" and the "parens patriae" function of the King
passed to the States.
Id. at 257 (citations and footnotes omitted).
128. Some people who read earlier versions of this Article were worried about our
reliance on Hendricks. No doubt the contentions we make in favor of a preventive
juvenile justice regime could stand on their own, without reference to that much maligned
decision. We nonetheless decided to use Hendricks as our springboard, not just because
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ramifications of adopting this theory of juvenile justice, 29 as well as
some modifications of these ramifications where they require reliance on
our incomplete knowledge of human behavior and thus would threaten
liberty interests. These proposals offer an alternative both to the juvenile
justice system of the past, which was too immersed in child-saving, and
the juvenile justice system of the present, which is becoming increasingly
punishment-oriented. Our ultimate goal is a system that is both humane
and just, at the same time it effectively protects society.
of its Supreme Court pedigree, but precisely because of its notoriety. The push for a
retributive system of juvenile justice is currently extremely powerful. It is our hope that
linking the juvenile court with the sexual predator model may provide a tactical means of
resisting that push. Those legislators who eagerly embrace the preventive crime control
scheme that Hendricks authorizes for sexual predators may well think twice about
imposing a punishment-oriented regime on children, if the equation between the two
groups made in this Article can be brought home to them.
129. One issue which we have not addressed is procedure. To the extent relaxed
procedures are the result of a parens patriae focus, their rationale disappears once the
basis of the juvenile court is located in the state's police power.
HeinOnline  -- 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 226 1999
